Torts - Minor Held to Adult Standard - Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App.2d 203, 182 N.E.2d 342 (1962) by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 12 
Issue 2 Spring-Summer 1963 Article 23 
Torts - Minor Held to Adult Standard - Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. 
App.2d 203, 182 N.E.2d 342 (1962) 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Torts - Minor Held to Adult Standard - Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App.2d 203, 182 
N.E.2d 342 (1962), 12 DePaul L. Rev. 361 (1963) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol12/iss2/23 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CASE NOTES
community. Even though a recent case ' stated that agricultural and resi-
dential lands which are economically sound could not be condemned by
the Port Authority of Seattle for an industrial project, the overall trend
seems to indicate that some day the "Public Use" requirement may be met
by a showing of a greater benefit from the new use than was being re-
ceived from the old.
81 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P. 2d 171 (1959).
TORTS-MINOR HELD TO ADULT STANDARD
A thirteen year old defendant, Paul Erickson, with his mother's per-
mission, drove the family pickup truck to meet a friend, Lawrence John-
son. The boys were returning home in their own vehicles after a com-
pleted day of swimming. Erickson was following 100 to 150 yards behind
the Johnson car at a speed of between 30 to 35 miles per hour along a
dusty road. The plaintiff, Fannie Betzold, traveling in an opposite direc-
tion, was unable to see the road because of the dust raised by the oncom-
ing Johnson car. Consequently, she stopped alongside a ditch on the right
side of the road. The plaintiff testified that the defendant's truck, which
was swaying to the right and to the left, went off the road into the ditch
colliding head-on into the plaintiff's automobile. The jury found that the
defendant was not guilty of negligence after the instruction that the
defendant was to be measured by the degree of. care "which an ordi-
narily prudent child of his age, experience, intelligence and capacity
would have exercised ... under the same or similar circumstances." The
appellate court held that the instruction was "decisive of this case" and
reversed the decision saying that under these or similar circumstances the
only standard of care the defendant could be judged by is the standard of
care required and expected of licensed drivers. Betzold v. Erickson, 35
11. App. 2d 203, 182 N.E. 2d 342 (1962).
Thus stands a somewhat unique problem. In what instances is an adult
standard applicable to a minor who is charged with actionable negligence?1
There is no precedent for the Betzold decision in Illinois. However, in
1 The most common situation involving a minor is when the question is whether or
not he is guilty of contributory negligence. The great weight of authority shows that
in these instances a child is only required to use the degree of care that an ordinarily
prudent child of the same capacity would use in the same situation. Allen v. Colaw, 27
Ill. App. 2d 304, 169 N.E. 2d 670 (1960); Molnar v. Slattery Contracting Co., 8 N.Y.
App. Div. 2d 95, 185 N.Y.S. 2d 449 (1959); Bolar v. Maxwell Hardware Co., 205 Cal.
396, 271 P. 97 (1928); Maskaliunas v. C&W I.I.R.R., 318 Tll. 142, 149 N.E. 23 (1925). It
is unusual for a minor to be charged with actionable negligence as compared to the
number of cases involving a minor's contributory negligence.
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Dellwo v. Pearson2 where a twelve-year-old defendant who was operating
a powerboat injured a woman, the Minnesota Supreme Court had to de-
cide what standard of care would be applicable to the defendant. The
trial court gave an instruction not unlike that given in the Betzold case.
The Supreme Court held that "in the operation of an automobile, air-
plane, or powerboat, a minor is to be held to the same standard of care as
an adult.""
Seemingly this decision results in a double standard for it is also held
that ". . . a child is only required to exercise that degree of care which the
great mass of children of the same age ordinarily exercise ... .-4 This rule
is strongly supported by several leading cases. In Singer v. Marx5 the
nine-year-old defendant was throwing rocks, one of which struck the
plaintiff in the eye as she passed by on her bicycle. In determining whether
or not the defendant was negligent the court said that he must be judged
by the standard of care which would ordinarily be exercised by children
of like age, capacity and experience. It would seem that the court felt
that throwing rocks or stones is an activity which is common to most
nine year old boys.6 In Briese v. Maechtle7 the injury occurred during
recess when the ten-year-old defendant was playing tag and the plaintiff
was playing marbles. The defendant, being chased by another boy, ran
around the school house and accidentally bumped into the plaintiff in-
juring the latter's eye. The court said that a minor is responsible for his
torts as is an adult. However, the court continued
marked difference between the tests of negligence as applied to the act of an
adult and the same act ... by a child. The rule is that a child is only required
to exercise that degree of care which the great mass of children of the same
age ordinarily exercise under the same circumstances, taking into account the
experience, capacity, and understanding of the child.8
2 Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W. 2d 859 (1961).
8 Id. at 458, 107 N.W. 2d at 863. (Emphasis added.)
4 Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 91, 130 N.W. 893, 894 (1911) (emphasis added).
5 Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 301 P. 2d 440 (1956).
6 1n Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A. 2d 395 (1957), a twelve-year-old de-
fendant who was playing with a gun that was negligently, left accessible to him acci-
dently shot an infant. The courts said that it was most important to consider the
capacity of the child to recognize the great danger involved in the use of a gun. They
held that the child was not to be judged by adult standards and that it was necessary
to measure the defendant's act by a standard which could reasonably have been ex-
pected of a child of like age, experience and intelligence. It is not unusual for young
children to see a gun in an open drawer and pick it up and examine it.
7 Briese v. Maechtle, 146 \Vis. 89, 130 N.W. 893 (1911).
8 Id. at 91, 130 N.W. at 894.
CASE NOTES
In Hoyt v. Rosenberg,9 a twelve-year-old defendant was engaged in the
common childhood game of kick-the-can. During the course of the game
the defendant kicked the can which struck the plaintiff in the face. In
deciding the case, the court said, "the test is, and must be, not what
an adult would have there done or what the results indicate should have
been done, but what an ordinary child in that situation would have done.' o
There is a striking similarity between Singer, Briese and Hoyt v. Rosen-
berg. In all three instances the children were engaged in activities which
are common only to children.
When minors are engaged in dangerous adult activities the fact that they
are held to a higher standard of care was indicated in the Dellwo and
Betzold cases. These cases are illustrative of the fact that the courts are rec-
ognizing that there are certain activities, such as driving motor vehicles,
which should be undertaken with at least the normal minimum degree of
competence 1 and that they "will hold the child defendant who is
engaging in dangerous adult activities to the standard of the reasonably
prudent adult."' 2 This was supported in Karr v. McNeil3 where a minor
defendant, while driving an automobile, struck a ten-year-old boy. The
court said that the defendant was under the same obligations as an adult
while driving an automobile and if she violated the standards set by law
she may properly be held liable. Here the minor was engaged in an ac-
tivity which is common only to adults.
When the court is presented with negligence of a minor, the issue is to
determine what standard of care is applicable. When a minor is partaking
in activities common to childhood that child should be measured by a
standard commensurate with his experience, capacity and general under-
standing. When engaged in dangerous adult activities, that same child
should be held to the standard of care of an adult. Therefore, we see, as
in the Briese and Hoyt cases, where the children were engaged in child-
hood activities, the courts measured the child by the standard of behavior
to be expected from a child of like age, experience and intelligence.14
9 Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 500, 182 P. 2d 234 (1947).
10 Id. at 507, 182 P. 2d at 238.
11 Apparently accepting this statement are Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W. 2d 72 (Mo.
1956); Karr v. McNeil, 92 Ohio App. 458, 110 N.E. 2d 714 (1962); Hill Trans. Co. v.
Everett, 145 F. 2d 746 (1st Cir., 1944); contra, Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501,
153 A.457 1931).
12 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, 927 (1956).
13 Karr v. McNeil, 92 Ohio App. 458, 110 N.E. 2d 714 (1952).
14 Heath v. Madsen, 273 Wis. 628, 79 N.W. 2d 73 (1956). Here a ten-year-old girl,
in tightening a saddle girth for the plaintiff was measured by the standard of case ex-
pected from a child of like age, experience, and intelligence. Also see RESTATEMENT. OF
TORTS § 283, comment e.
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However, when a minor is operating a motor vehicle as in the Betzold
and Dellwo cases, that minor should be judged by the standards of an
adult. 15 The Minnesota Court, in the Dellwo opinion, made a fine state-
ment of reason for the difference.
To give legal sanction to the operation of automobiles by teen-agers with less
than ordinary care for the safety of others is impractical today, to say the
least. We may take judicial notice of the hazards of automobile traffic, the
frequency of accidents, the often catastrophic results of accidents, and the
fact that immature individuals are no less prone to accidents than adults. While
minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with age, experi-
ence, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age, ex-
perience, and wisdom, it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in
the operation of a motor vehicle to observe any other standards of care and
conduct than those expected of all others. A person observing children at play
with toys, throwing balls, operating tricycles or velocipedes, or engaged in
other childhood activities may anticipate conduct that does not reach an adult
standard of care or prudence. However, one cannot know whether the operator
of an approaching automobile, airplane, or powerboat is a minor or an adult,
and usually cannot protect himself against youthful imprudence, even if
warned. Accordingly we hold that in the operation of an automobile, airplane,
or powerboat, a minor is to be held to the same standard of care as an adult.16
15Wittmier v. Post, 78 S.D. 520, 105 N.W. 2d 65 (1960) dictum. Also see RESTATE-
MENT OF TORT S, TENTATVE DRAFT No. 4, S 283, comment c.
16 Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W. 2d 858, 863 (1961).
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE TRUSTS: ILLEGAL PURPOSE
In his will, the testator set up a trust "to be used for the care, support,
medical attention, education, sustenance, maintenance or custody of such
minor Negro child or children, whose father or mother, or both, have
been incarcerated, imprisoned, detained or committed in any federal, state,
county, or local prison or penitentiary as a result of the conviction of a
crime or misdemeanor of a political nature."' A violation of the Smith
Act2 would constitute such a crime. A grandnephew, hoping to derive
the trust proceeds through the law of intestate succession, now challenges
the validity of the trust. The District Court upheld the Superior Court's
decision that the trust was invalid. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
the order was reversed in favor of the administrator. In Re Robbins'
Estate, 57 Cal. Rep. 2d 765, 371 P. 2d 573 (1962).
1 In re Robbins' Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 765, 766, 371 P. 2d 573 (1962). The Court quotes
from the trust.
2 18 U.S.C. S 2385. This act deals with advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Govern-
ment.
